The Rwandan government rejected a report published on 10 June 2026 by alleging forced recruitment and detention by the armed group March 23 Movement (M23) in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, with claims extending to wider regional involvement. The report argues that abuses occurred during intensified fighting in late 2025 and early 2026 across several conflict-affected areas.
Rwanda’s response and counterarguments
In a post published on X on 11 June 2026 at 17:25, Government Spokesperson Yolande Makolo dismissed the report as part of a “30-year pattern” of allegations based on anonymous sources and insufficient verification. The statement criticized what it described as conclusions reached without adequate forensic investigation or sustained field access in active conflict zones.
The post also referenced earlier critiques of the organization’s methodology, arguing that similar concerns about reporting standards have been raised over time. It further accused the report of overlooking the role of multiple armed actors in eastern Congo, including the Congolese government’s cooperation with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), alongside local militias commonly referred to as Wazalendo, foreign mercenary elements, and Burundian forces operating in the region.
The statement rejected any conflation between the Rwanda Defence Force and the March 23 Movement (M23)-aligned coalition, insisting they are separate entities and should not be treated as a single operational force. It also emphasized that credible investigations should rely on impartial access, verifiable field evidence, and due process rather than pre-determined conclusions.
Attention was also drawn to ongoing diplomatic initiatives, with the post highlighting the Washington Accords as the preferred framework for resolving the conflict. These efforts are presented as prioritizing structured dialogue, regional cooperation, and long-term stabilization over punitive or unilateral measures.
Additional evidence and arguments
Rwandan Officials frequently point to the continued presence of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in eastern Congo as a central security concern. This group is a persistent cross-border threat, with historical links to perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi and remains active in several forested and remote areas near the border.
Another recurring argument is the contested nature of previous United Nations Group of Experts findings (notably 2022–2025 reports) that suggested external support to M23. Kigali has consistently challenged these reports, saying they rely heavily on confidential or second-hand intelligence sources and lack sufficient on-the-ground verification or transparent evidentiary chains.
Regional peace frameworks are also cited as evidence of engagement in diplomacy rather than escalation. The Luanda Process and Nairobi Process (active through 2023–2026) have involved multiple mediation rounds aimed at addressing armed groups, coordinating regional security responses, and reducing tensions between states involved in the conflict.
In addition, officials point to battlefield complexity in eastern Congo, where multiple armed groups, local militias, and national forces operate in overlapping zones. They argue that this environment makes attribution of responsibility highly contested and that many international reports understate violence attributed to non-state militias and state-allied groups other than M23.
Humanitarian and monitoring challenges are also cited, including limited access for independent investigators in active combat zones and rapidly shifting frontlines during 2025–2026. It is argued that these constraints often lead to reliance on indirect testimonies, which can affect the reliability of conclusions drawn by external organizations.
