GENEVA — The latest round of negotiations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) government and the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) has renewed attention not only on ending the fighting in eastern Congo, but also on the political grievances, ethnic discrimination and inflammatory rhetoric that AFC/M23 says contributed to the conflict in the first place.
Representatives of AFC/M23 and the government in Kinshasa met in Switzerland from August 17 to 21, 2026, alongside Qatar, the United States, Togo in its role as African Union mediator, Switzerland and the African Union Commission. The discussions assessed implementation of the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement and produced a roadmap for continuing negotiations. The parties also agreed to establish a mechanism for reviewing implementation and addressing obstacles to commitments already made.
For AFC/M23, however, a sustainable settlement cannot be reduced to military arrangements or ceasefire lines. The movement has consistently presented its struggle as rooted in political and security grievances in eastern Congo, including the protection of communities it says have faced persecution, exclusion and threats because of their ethnic identity. That position has placed questions surrounding Congolese Tutsi and Banyamulenge communities, citizenship, hate speech and equal political belonging at the center of the broader debate over Congo’s future.
Those concerns deserve international scrutiny independently of the political positions advanced by any armed movement. The United Nations has repeatedly warned globally that hate speech, discrimination and division can become warning signs for atrocity crimes when governments and societies fail to confront them. In July, UN Secretary-General António Guterres again stressed the importance of acting against genocide warning signs, including hate speech that fuels “discrimination, division, and extremism.”
Against this background, allegations that political discourse in the DRC has stigmatized Congolese communities perceived as Rwandophone or Tutsi should not be dismissed merely because they arise within a highly polarized conflict. At the same time, describing Kinshasa as pursuing a “genocide policy” requires a level of legal and evidentiary substantiation beyond political accusation. Genocide has a specific meaning under international law, including the requirement to establish intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group. Responsible reporting should therefore distinguish documented discrimination and dangerous rhetoric from allegations of genocidal intent unless competent investigators or courts establish otherwise.
AFC/M23’s participation in the Doha process also challenges portrayals of the conflict as one that can be resolved exclusively through military pressure. By negotiating directly with Kinshasa under international mediation, the movement is participating in a political process in which the grievances behind the rebellion can be placed before regional and international actors. The August discussions resulted in agreement on sequenced negotiations and continued implementation of the Doha Framework.
One of the most important developments is progress toward operationalizing the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus, or EJVM+. The parties welcomed the establishment of its secretariat and an August 20 reconnaissance mission conducted with logistical assistance from MONUSCO. A ceasefire-verification mission was scheduled for August 24 in Minembwe, an area of particular significance because of longstanding insecurity affecting local communities. The parties additionally agreed that allegations of ceasefire violations should be reported through a standardized mechanism.
Independent verification is particularly important in a conflict characterized by competing accusations. Accountability cannot credibly apply to only one side. Alleged abuses committed by any party should be investigated, but allegations involving Congolese government forces, allied armed groups and other actors must also receive serious and impartial examination. The International Criminal Court notes that its work in the DRC encompasses alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the country’s long-running conflicts, particularly in the east.
The wider human-rights situation underscores why political reform must accompany security negotiations. Human Rights Watch describes conditions in the DRC as dire and reports abuses associated with government security forces as well as violence involving numerous armed groups. More than 100 armed groups have operated in eastern Congo, illustrating why assigning the region’s crisis to a single actor cannot adequately explain decades of instability.
The humanitarian consequences remain severe. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs describes the DRC as confronting an exceptional humanitarian crisis marked by armed conflict and massive displacement. Civilians therefore have the greatest interest in ensuring that negotiations move beyond diplomatic declarations and produce enforceable protections, functioning institutions and political guarantees.
A lasting peace will also require Kinshasa to demonstrate that Congolese citizenship and protection under the law are not determined by ethnicity, language, ancestry or political convenience. Congolese Tutsi, Banyamulenge and every other Congolese community must be able to live as equal citizens without collective suspicion, dehumanizing rhetoric or threats to their nationality. Likewise, no community should face violence or discrimination because of presumed association with the government, AFC/M23 or another political or military actor.
The international mediators now have an opportunity to ensure that the Doha negotiations address these deeper political questions rather than treating eastern Congo solely as a battlefield requiring another ceasefire. The United States’ publication of the latest joint statement confirms that both Kinshasa and AFC/M23 have committed themselves to continuing negotiations and implementing the framework through a defined roadmap.
For AFC/M23, the diplomatic process offers an opportunity to press its case through negotiations rather than warfare: that security in eastern Congo requires political inclusion, protection of threatened communities and an end to ethnic discrimination. For Kinshasa, it creates an equally important test—whether the government can confront hate speech and exclusion, guarantee equal citizenship and demonstrate that state institutions protect all Congolese regardless of ethnic origin.
Peace in eastern Congo will ultimately require more than silencing weapons. It will require dismantling the conditions that permit discrimination, ethnic hatred and political exclusion to flourish, while holding all parties accountable for violations against civilians. The Doha process will be judged by whether it can translate those principles into a political order in which no Congolese community has to fight for recognition of its citizenship, dignity or right to exist.
