Faced with mounting criticism, territorial losses, and a fragile negotiating position, President Félix Tshisekedi and his government are subtly retooling their approach to the Doha peace talks with the M23 rebel group. What appears as a shift in strategy aims not only at securing a ceasefire and political agreement, but also at insulating the presidency from blame should the talks falter.
Background: Doha, Declarations, Stalemates ,Since early 2025, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been engulfed by intensified conflict, with M23 making rapid gains ,including control over Goma and Bukavu , and displacing hundreds of thousands.
The Doha process, mediated by Qatar, gained traction when the DRC government and M23 signed a Declaration of Principles on July 19, promising to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, exchange prisoners, and restore state authority in areas under rebel control. But from the start, critical confidence-building measures have lagged , notably the release of detainees, clarity around what “state authority” entails, and precisely what withdrawal, if any, would mean.
As of August–September, the Doha talks are threatened by impasse. The two sides disagree over whether the release of M23-held prisoners should be a precondition to formal negotiations or part of later implementation. Kinshasa firmly insists that such releases be embedded in the final settlement. Meanwhile, the rebels have argued that without these gestures now, trust cannot be built.
Tactical Tweaks: How Tshisekedi is Resetting His Position ,Analysts observe that Tshisekedi, without abandoning negotiation, is adjusting key tactical stances in ways that let him maintain domestic legitimacy and shift blame for any failure. Key elements include:
- Tightening public expectations. By emphasizing that progress depends heavily on M23 fulfilling its commitments , prisoner release, clarity on control of territory , the government is laying the groundwork to label any deadlock as the rebels’ fault.
- Asserting procedural legitimacy. Kinshasa insists on formal, legalistic processes (e.g. that releases occur only with a final agreement in place) rather than unilateral or symbolic moves. This reduces room for criticism if those moves are delayed or never happen.
- Keeping the moral high ground. The government often depicts itself as the party committed to peace, adhering to international mediation protocols, and seeking to protect civilians. Any failures are thus framed as stemming from rebel intransigence rather than state mismanagement or military weakness.
- Diplomatic maneuvering. Tshisekedi has leaned on international actors ,Qatar as mediator, EAC-SADC, Western powers , both to pressure M23/Rwanda and to signal that the DRC is not isolated. This external validation bolsters its claim that failures would be due to the other negotiating party.
Implications: Risks and Possibilities ,The redirection of strategy may offer some advantages but also carries serious risks:
- Domestic political risk. If the DRC government is seen to stall — for example, by refusing to release prisoners preemptively or delaying implementation of agreements — Tshisekedi may lose credibility among Congolese the people expecting swift peace.
- Trust deficits. M23 and its backers could interpret the insistence on procedural preconditions as a bad-faith tactic. If the government is perceived as erecting obstacles, M23 may further hamper or abandon the peace process.
- Operational constraints. The DRC’s military challenges (recruitment, command structure, logistics, etc.) remain serious. Without on-the-ground control, the government’s capacity to enforce terms, even if negotiated, is limited.
- International pressure. Donor and mediator impatience could grow if visible progress remains elusive. There is a risk of sanctions or diplomatic fallout if the government seems to be dragging its feet. Vice versa, if violence resumes, Kinshasa could face blame, regardless of negotiation framing.
The Blame-Game Strategy: What to Watch For ,Given what we’ve observed, here are warning signals that Tshisekedi’s administration is seeking to shift responsibility for failure ahead of time:
- Public statements stressing M23’s obligations (prisoner release, withdrawal, etc.) and emphasising that government has already performed its part.
- Repeating claims that any agreement depends on M23/Rwanda honoring prior commitments.
- Delays in implementing agreed steps (e.g. setting up credible monitoring, restoring services in rebel-held territory) and then blaming lack of cooperation.
- Use of international pronouncements or diplomatic pressure to validate government claims of good faith.
Outlook ,Unless major breakthroughs occur — especially on confidence-building measures — the risk is that Doha ends up another interim pause rather than a lasting peace treaty. The DRC government appears determined not to be caught in the fallout if that happens. But the cost of that risk could be very high: renewed conflict, displacement, erosion of trust, and possibly severe reputational damage.
Bottom line: Tshisekedi’s current strategy is less about got-to-have breakthroughs than about safeguarding political capital while keeping negotiation alive. He seems to be hedging: committed enough to engage, but framing the terms so that failures can be accredited to the rebel side.
