The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has taken varying public positions over the years regarding the terrorist group known as Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an armed group that has remained at the center of security tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. While both governments recognize the regional security implications of the group’s presence, they have consistently differed on its military capabilities, influence, and the level of support it receives. The issue has become a recurring subject in regional diplomacy, peace negotiations, and international security discussions.
The DRC government’s official statements regarding the FDLR have shifted repeatedly. At various points, officials in Kinshasa have argued that the group no longer exists as a meaningful force or that its members are elderly fighters incapable of posing a significant threat. At other times, however, the same government has publicly acknowledged the group’s presence, describing it as a security concern and expressing support for dismantling the organization while facilitating the reintegration of its members into civilian life. The FDLR was established by individuals accused of participating in the planning and execution of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, including former political leaders, members of the defeated Rwandan Armed Forces (Ex-FAR), and Interahamwe militia members. According to the Rwandan government, the organization continues to recruit younger members and remains operational in eastern DRC in partnership with DRC government military forces.
Rwanda maintains that the FDLR constitutes a direct national security threat because of its continued presence near the common border, while the DRC government has often prioritized military operations against AFC/M23, arguing that addressing that conflict should take precedence. The FDLR issue has featured prominently in regional peace initiatives, from mediation efforts in Pretoria more than two decades ago to negotiations in Luanda beginning in 2022 and the Washington peace process launched in early 2025. The Washington Peace Agreement included provisions calling for the dismantling of the FDLR through measures outlined in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Despite signing the agreement, the DRC government’s subsequent public statements have continued to generate debate regarding its commitment to implementing those provisions.
For several years, senior officials in Kinshasa argued that the FDLR lacked the capacity to threaten Rwanda’s security, suggesting that Rwanda had exaggerated the group’s significance and was using the issue to justify involvement in eastern DRC and pursue access to the country’s natural resources. In March 2025, former DRC Foreign Minister Dr. Christophe Lutundula questioned whether the FDLR remained a meaningful force and stated that he did not recognize the organization as Rwanda described it. He further argued that the principal issue between the two countries had shifted from security to economic concerns. Following the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement in June 2025, DRC Minister of Foreign Trade Julien Paluku also dismissed the FDLR as a narrative promoted by Rwanda, arguing that the country’s true interest lay in the DRC’s mineral resources. Rwanda’s Ambassador to Algeria, Vincent Karega, responded by saying such remarks were unsurprising given Paluku’s previous role as Governor of North Kivu Province, where the FDLR has long maintained a presence, including within Virunga National Park.
Despite these earlier statements, the DRC government later publicly acknowledged both the presence of the FDLR and the security concerns associated with the group. On April 15, 2024, Major General Sylvain Ekenge, then spokesperson for the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), stated during a televised interview that the FDLR operated inside the country and had contributed significantly to violence against Congolese civilians. He asserted that the group had played a major role in the deaths of many Congolese over the years. His remarks attracted attention because of his extensive military experience in North Kivu, where he had served as military operations spokesperson and acting provincial military governor. Later, in October 2025, FARDC issued a directive instructing its soldiers to end cooperation with the FDLR while calling on the group’s fighters to surrender their weapons or face military operations. Despite the directive, critics later alleged that cooperation between elements of FARDC and the FDLR continued, including claims that the armed group continued receiving weapons and ammunition and did not disarm within the 90-day period envisioned during peace discussions.
As international attention increasingly focused on implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement, the DRC government argued that many FDLR fighters were operating in territories controlled by AFC/M23, making military operations against the group more difficult. In late March 2026, FARDC announced in Kisangani that operations to dismantle the FDLR had begun. However, reports later alleged that military supplies were subsequently delivered to FDLR fighters in Pinga, Walikale Territory, where they were engaged in fighting against AFC/M23. A United Nations panel of experts reported in late June 2026 that elements of FARDC had assured the FDLR that cooperation would continue rather than ending through dismantlement. Additional reports from eastern DRC suggested that some FDLR fighters had been encouraged to relocate into AFC/M23-controlled territory, a move critics argued could complicate future military operations against the group. On July 30, 2026, FDLR political spokesperson Cure Ngoma stated that the organization’s forces were located primarily in territories controlled by AFC/M23. Meanwhile, discussions conducted through the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM), involving representatives of Rwanda, the DRC, and the United States, concluded that while some FDLR fighters were present in AFC/M23-controlled areas, others remained in territory under the authority of the DRC government. In June 2026, U.S. Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos told the United Nations Security Council that the DRC had not fulfilled its commitment to dismantle the FDLR, at least within the areas under its own control.
Further debate emerged after a document reportedly signed by FDLR President Lt. Gen. Victor Byiringiro on May 30, 2026, and addressed to President Félix Tshisekedi, circulated in international media. The document outlined a proposal for the voluntary disarmament of FDLR fighters, their reintegration into civilian life, and placement in secured facilities. Beginning on July 13, 2026, DRC Minister for Regional Integration Floribert Anzuluni reportedly distributed the document to governments across Africa and Europe as evidence of an agreement between the DRC government and the FDLR concerning voluntary disarmament. Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Ambassador Olivier Nduhungirehe responded that the document was not part of the Washington Peace Agreement. On July 29, he emphasized that the FDLR was not a signatory to the Washington accord and maintained that the agreement instead required the group’s complete dismantlement in accordance with CONOPS to support lasting regional peace. The following day, DRC government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya stated that if the FDLR voluntarily laid down its weapons and accepted reintegration, there would be no justification for the Congolese military to launch attacks against the group, arguing that military force should not be used against individuals who had freely chosen a peaceful path.
Belgian political scientist Professor Bob Kabamba of the University of Liège cautioned that even if the FDLR were formally dissolved, its members could potentially reorganize under another name. He observed that the movement had previously evolved from earlier organizations, including RDR and ALiR, while maintaining similar political and military structures. Taken together, the DRC government’s public messaging regarding the FDLR has evolved considerably over the years. Officials have at different times denied the group’s significance, acknowledged its presence, pledged to dismantle it, and more recently suggested that voluntary disarmament and reintegration could replace military action if the organization chooses a peaceful path. These developments continue to shape regional diplomacy and remain a central issue in ongoing efforts to advance peace and security in the Great Lakes region.
