Goma – Relations between the government of Democratic Republic of Congo President Félix Tshisekedi and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a group founded by individuals linked to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, continue to draw attention as the conflict in eastern Congo evolves. Reports from intelligence sources, regional observers, and Rwandan officials describe what they characterize as an increasingly close relationship between elements of the Congolese state and the FDLR, a movement that Rwanda has long identified as a major security threat.
At the center of the organization is FDLR-FOCA military commander Pacifique Ntawunguka, widely known as General Omega. According to various reports, the group has continued to strengthen both its military and political structures while maintaining ambitions of returning to Rwanda through armed struggle. Intelligence assessments cited by regional sources estimated that by mid-2025 the movement had between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters. Later that year, military spokesperson Lt. Col. Octavien Mutimura publicly stated that the organization possessed a significant fighting force capable of resisting military offensives.
The resurgence of M23 fighters at the end of 2021 reshaped the security landscape in eastern Congo. Beyond confronting the Congolese army, M23 leaders argued that one of their objectives was to remove the FDLR from Congolese territory, accusing the group of targeting Congolese Tutsi communities through intimidation, land seizures, violence, and killings. At the time, many FDLR fighters were reportedly operating from areas around Virunga National Park and Mount Nyiragongo, with General Omega based in a military camp known as “Paris” in Rutshuru Territory, one of the movement’s principal command centers.
The organization maintains a structured military hierarchy that mirrors the command system of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (Ex-FAR), from which many of its senior leaders originated. General Omega is assisted by Major General Cyprien Uzabakiriho, known as “Ave Maria,” while military intelligence operations are overseen by Brigadier General Sebastien Uwimbabazi, also known as “Nyembo Abdallah.” Military operations are directed by Brigadier General Lucien Nzabanita, while the movement’s elite CRAP unit has been associated with commanders including Colonel Pierre-Célestin Rurakabije, known as “Simba Guillaume,” and Colonel Gustave Kubwayo, known as “Sirkoof.”
According to numerous reports, ideological training remains a central pillar of the organization. Recruits are allegedly taught that political power in Rwanda should be reclaimed through armed struggle and that Hutus should once again govern the country. Critics argue that such teachings perpetuate ethnic hatred, discrimination, and genocidal ideology. Investigative reports have indicated that these programs are conducted at facilities supervised by Brigadier General Bernard Mutunzi, known as “Manzi,” and are frequently visited by senior FDLR officials. Before his death in December 2023, Colonel Protogène Ruvugayimikore was reportedly among the leading figures responsible for indoctrinating new recruits. Political oversight of the movement is attributed to its president, Lieutenant General Gaston Iyamuremye, also known as Victor Byiringiro or Rumuri.
As M23 expanded its military operations, the FDLR found itself under increasing pressure. Having already lost several prominent leaders over the years, including military commander Sylvestre Mudacumura and former president Ignace Murwanashyaka, the movement reportedly saw cooperation with the Congolese army as an opportunity for survival. Reports indicate that some Congolese military officials viewed the group as a useful ally because of its experience in guerrilla warfare and its decades-long presence in eastern Congo.
One of the most frequently cited examples of this alleged cooperation traces back to a meeting held in Pinga, Walikale Territory, in May 2022. Organized under the authority of Major General Peter Cirimwami Nkuba, then responsible for military operations in North Kivu, the gathering brought together representatives of several armed groups and the Congolese army. According to accounts of the meeting, participants agreed to coordinate efforts against M23, which they viewed as a common enemy. Armed groups were reportedly promised salaries and military support in exchange for their participation.
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The alleged collaboration later became a source of controversy following attacks in Nturo village in Masisi Territory in October 2023. The village, inhabited largely by Congolese Tutsi civilians, was burned during an assault that survivors attributed to a coalition involving FDLR fighters, Wazalendo militias, and elements of the Congolese military. Witness accounts described a coordinated operation involving elite government troops known as the “Hiboux,” CRAP fighters, and local militia forces.
Despite these partnerships, government-aligned forces continued to lose territory as AFC/M23 expanded its control across much of North Kivu. As front lines shifted, some FDLR fighters reportedly relocated to military positions in Mubambiro near Goma, where they operated alongside Congolese government troops and Wazalendo fighters. By early 2025, intensified AFC/M23 offensives in Rutshuru, Masisi, and Nyiragongo forced General Omega and many of his fighters to withdraw to other areas, including parts of Masisi and Walikale.
Recent intelligence reports suggest that cooperation between the Congolese army and the FDLR has not only continued but deepened. Unlike earlier periods when coordination was allegedly driven primarily by military officers in North Kivu, current reports claim that authorities in Kinshasa are now more directly involved. According to these accounts, Brigadier General Uwimbabazi and Brigadier General Nzabanita were tasked with maintaining regular communication with Congolese military leaders concerning joint operations and strategic planning.
Questions about Kinshasa’s intentions intensified in March 2026 when Major General Jacques Nduru Ychaligonza, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Congolese Armed Forces responsible for operations and intelligence, traveled to Kisangani. Officially, his mission was presented as part of efforts to dismantle the FDLR. However, reports later emerged alleging that meetings took place between Ychaligonza and General Omega regarding the redeployment of FDLR fighters into AFC/M23-controlled areas. According to these claims, such a move would allow Kinshasa to argue before the international community that the group could not be neutralized because it was operating outside government-controlled territory.
The controversy grew further after Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ambassador Olivier Nduhungirehe, alleged that within 48 hours of Ychaligonza’s arrival in Kisangani, aircraft transported nearly 700 weapons, including firearms and mortars, along with ammunition and funds, to FDLR fighters in Walikale. The minister argued that the deliveries contradicted public commitments made by Congolese authorities to eliminate the movement.
At the political level, critics of President Tshisekedi have also pointed to his engagement with Rwandan opposition figures and former officials living in exile. Reports indicate that among those received in Kinshasa were Jean-Luc Habyarimana, the son of former Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, as well as former FDLR-linked figures such as Faustin Murego and Thaddée Kwitonda. These meetings have fueled accusations from Kigali and its supporters that Kinshasa is maintaining relationships with individuals associated with organizations hostile to Rwanda.
Another incident that attracted attention occurred in January 2025 when First Lady Denise Nyakeru visited wounded combatants receiving treatment in Kinshasa. Reports claimed that among those hospitalized was a fighter from the FDLR’s CRAP unit, a detail cited by critics as further evidence of the close relationship between Congolese authorities and the armed group.
As diplomatic tensions between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo continue, allegations regarding cooperation between the Congolese government and the FDLR remain at the center of regional security debates. For Rwanda, the continued presence and activities of the FDLR represent an unresolved threat rooted in the legacy of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. For Kinshasa, accusations of collaboration with the group have become a major source of international scrutiny as efforts to restore stability in eastern Congo continue.
